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I
I

Appeal from a verdict of Guilty to a charge of Assault
With Intent to Commit Murder With a Revolver, and from
the judgment and sentence imposed thereupon by the Honorable Maurice Harding, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Utah County.
The appellant will hereinafter be referred to as the Defendant and the plaintiff and respondent will be referred to
as the State.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant, John Charles Wilks, was charged in the Fourth
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, with the
crime of assault with intent to commit murder with a revolver,
allegedly committed on September 2, 1969, in Utah County,
Utah, as follows, to-wit:
1
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"Richard L. Maxfield, District Attorney for the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Utah, accuses John Charles
Wilks of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder
and charges that on or about the 2nd day of September, 1969,
at Utah County, State of Utah, the said John Charles Wilks
did assault Charles Waren with a revolver with intent to commit murder." (See information) To the charge contained in
the information, the Defendant entered a plea of "Not Guilty",
and the case was set to be tried before a jury on February 4
and 5, 1970. The trial was held in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the
request of the Defendant in an attempt to obtain a more impartial jury, which said request was approved by the Court.
At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict as to
the Defendant of "Guilty of Assault With Intent to Commit
Murder", (Tr. 141). On February 5, 1970, immediately after
the conclusion of the trial and the rendering of the verdict to
the jury, the Defendant waived any time for the pronouncing
of the judgment (Tr. 142). Whereupon, the Judge sentenced
the Defendant to confinement in the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term of not less than 5 years nor more than
life. (Tr. 143).
Upon the trial of the case the State called as witnesses
Richard Floyd Duke, a Springville police officer (Tr. 7), Clair
Rasmussen, highway patrolman (Tr. 27), Dr. Chester B.
Powell (Tr. 33), Mr. Mack Holley, Utah County Sheriff
Deputy (Tr. 102), Mr. Nelson S. Evans, highway patrolman
(Tr. 128), and Mr. Roy Helm, Assistant Superintendent of
Utah Highway Patrol (Tr. 131). The Defendant called as
witnesses Rudolph Lopez Moreno by reading i.nto the record
the transcript of the hearing called for the purpose of taking
said testimony (Tr. 57), and the Defendant, John Charles
Wilks (Tr. 74).
2
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From the evidence introduced it appears without substantial conflict that duri.ng the day of September 2, 1969,
Defendant, John Charles Wilks, was driving a vehicle north
on the freeway toward Springville, Utah County, Utah, with
Rudolph Lopez Moreno as a passenger in the front right seat
of the car at a time when there was a .22 caliber pistol and a
kni.fe on the front seat between the driver and the passenger.
(Tr. 59) The gun had been in the possession of both the Defendant and the passenger Moreno. (Tr. 60) Defendant and
his passenger discovered that they were being followed by a
highway patrol car, and they turned off the freeway toward
Springville, Utah, on the street known as 400 South Street,
they being aware that the patrol car had followed them approximately three miles. (Tr. 69) When the Defendant discovered that the patrol car was following him off the freeway,
he pulled the car over to the si.de of the road as he was proceeding east on 400 South in such a position as to have the two
right wheels of the car Defendant was driving off the paved
portion of the highway, with a patrol car being driven by
Officer Charles Warren stopping behi.nd the Defendant's car
a distance of approximately 15 or 16 feet. Officer Duke, the
Springville policeman, proceeded by radio call on 400 South
Street toward the Defendant's car, crossed over and stopped
in front of the Defendant's vehicle a distance of approximately
12 to 15 feet by adding the length of the front of the car driven
by Officer Duke to the driver's seat, (Tr. 13) and at a time
when the Defendant's car had completely stopped. (Tr.11)
Officer Duke was carrying a .357 Colt Magnum Pistol. (Tr.
11). Officer Warren, from his car parked behind Defendant's
car, got out of the patrol car a distance of approximately 2
to 3 feet from the left side of his car toward the paved portion
of the street. Officer Warren cautiously approached Defendant's vehicle, raised his right hand to his sip and unsnapped
3
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his gun and placed his right hand on the butt of his gun,
motioning Defendant to come toward Officer Warren with
Officer Warren's left hand at a time when Officer Duke
thought Officer Warren was motioning for Officer Duke to
proceed and come forward. (Tr. 12) The pistol in the car of
the Defendant was a .22 caliber single shot pistol. (See Defendant's Exhibit IV).
At this point the testimony is in conflict. Officer Duke
at the time of the trial testified that he stopped 8 to 10 feet
in front of suspect's vehicle; (Tr. 10, line 24) that Defendant's
car was stopped in such a position that the right wheels were
just off the paved portion of the road; (Tr. 10, line 28) that
Officer Warren was approximately 2 to 3 feet away from his
left front door toward the center of the road when he motioned for the Defendant to come out of the car; (Tr. 11, line
19) that as Defendant leaned out of his car, two shots rang
out, Officer Warren was failing with his gun still holstered ;
(Tr. 13, line 18) that Officer Duke was standing behind his
left front door when he heard the shots ring out, unholstered
his gun and fired one shot at the Defendant; (Tr. 14) that
Defendant returned Officer Duke's fire and then Officer
Duke in turn returned three more shots at the Defendant,
after which ti.me Defendant jumped from his car on the left
side and ran away from Officer Duke and between the Defendant's car and Trooper Warren's vehicle and out into a
field; (Tr. 14) Officer Duke, after Defendant had run into
the field, saw Officer Warren wi.pe his forehead with his
handkerchief. (Tr. 16) Officer Duke did not see the .22
caliber single shot pistol in Defendant's hand at any time.
(Tr. 19) Officer Duke testified that the first two shots were
one ri.ght on top of the other. (Tr. 19) Officer Duke testified
that one of his shots ricocheted off the left front door of
Defendant's car and one ricocheted off the hood of Defendant's

4
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car into the windshield. (Tr. 20) Officer Duke stated that
when he saw Officer Warren in the road, Officer Warren's
head was 15 feet to 18 feet from the left front door of Defendant's car, and that Officer Warren was from 7 to 8 feet from
Defendant when the first two shots were fired. (Tr. 26, 27)
After the first shot was fired by Officer Duke, Warren had
dropped out of Officer Duke's sight. (Tr. 23)
Officer Rasmussen testified that as he approached the
scene from a distance of tbout two blocks, he saw Officer
Warren standing at the left of his vehicle. (Tr. 28) Officer
Rasmussen was driving at a hi.gh rate of speed at the time he
first saw Officer Warren standing to the left of his car with
Warren's hands on his hips and his right hand being near
his weapon; that he saw Officer Warren go down at a time
when he heard only one shot, and Officer Warren did not
draw his revolver. (Tr. 29) Officer Rasmussen stopped his
car behind Trooper Warren's and fired three times at the
Defendant running into an open field. (Tr. 30)
Dr. Chester B. Powell testified upon examining Officer
Warren in Salt Lake City that he found two circular wounds
approximately % of an inch apart on the right forehead toward the temple, appeared to be bullet wounds and wounds of
entry, and he found no wounds of exit. (Tr. 35) Dr. Powell
performed surgery on the head of Officer Warren, and with
the suction tube removed a blood hemorrhage plus a number
of small bullet fragments. (Tr. 37) Dr. Powell further testified that the two holes in Officer Warren's head were approximately 1/i of an inch in diameter, about %. of an inch
apart, and they looked to Dr. Powell like they might have
been made by a .32 sized bullet. (Tr. 38) At Tr. 39, the
District Attorney asked Dr. Powell as follows:
Line 8, Page 39 : "Doctor, previous testimony has
5
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indicated that Trooper Warren took his handkerchief
from his pocket and wiped his forehead and put his
handkerchief back into his pocket after this injury.
Is that possible? Is that something normal with an
injury of this type?"
Answer: "Yes. It would have been possible. But it
would have had to occurred within 20 or 30 seconds
from the injury. After that, I don't think he would
have been conscious or able to have done any voluntary movement."
Line 17, Page 39: "Do you have an opinion as to
whether his condition at that time would have allowed him to have fired his gun?"
Answer: "Not unless he had fired it before he had
sustained the gunshot wound himself."
Dr. Powell testified that the bullet fragments removed
from the head of Officer Warren were not large enough to
identify the size of the bullet that had been fired, and that
the little fragments were about 1/16 of an inch in diameter.
(Tr. 41) The District Attorney asked Dr. Powell whether
or not Officer Warren could now remember the events of the
shooting. Dr. Powell testified that Officer Warren was "unable to recollect any events when I have asked him, and I
would not expect his to have recollected the circ,umstances."
(Tr. 43) After Dr. Powell had testified as to the nature and
extend of the injuries of Officer Warren and over the strenuous objection of Defendant's counsel which was made off the
transcript record and between the Court and all counsel but
which is made a part of the record under Defendant's motion
for new trial, Trooper Warren was permitted to be brought
into the courtroom sitting in a wheelchair. (Tr. 44) Dr.
Powell then proceeded to demonstrate on the head of Officer
Warren sitting i.n the wheelchair the general area where
th holes occurred, but were not visible to anyone in the court6
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room and to which Officer Warren could not and did not make
any response. (Tr. 44) Dr. Powell testified over the strenuous objection of Defendant's counsel of lack of foundation for
the testimony, and no evidence of measurements of the calculation that the bullets retained in the head of Officer Warren could either be a .22 deformed or a .32, but that he did
not think it would be larger than a .32. (Tr. 46) On crossexamination Dr. Powell testified that when bullets strike a
skull very strange things happen, that they become distended,
might explode, break in two, that it is possible for one bullet
that is split in two to make the two holes in the head of Of.
ficer Warren, and that there was no way of determining
whether there was more than one bullet track through the
brain of Officer Warren. (Tr. 47) Dr. Powell further testified on cross-exami.nation that the X-rays taken were not
specifically to determine the size of the object that still remained in the head of Officer Warren. (Tr. 48)
After the testimony of Dr. Powell the State rested. At
that time defense counsel made a motion out of the presence
of the jury for the Court to direct a verdict in favor of the
Defendant. This was at a time when the Defendant's gun
had not been offered into evidence and that the only evidence
was that the Defendant was seen running from the scene
with the gun in his hand. (Tr. 51, 52) The Court denied the
motion. Defendant's counsel requested after the deni.al of
the motion that the State produce Officer Warren's gun for
the Defendant's case and that Defendant would put on testimony to the effect that Officer Warren's gun had, in fact,
been fired more than once. The Court did not rule upon
Defendant counsel's request for the production of Warren's
gun. (Tr. 53, 54).
At the commencement of the Defendant's case, Moreno,
7
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through his deposition, testified that after Wilks had stopped
the car, Moreno heard vVarren request Wilks to get out of
the car and motioned Wilks with his hand to come out; that
Officer Warren unleashed his holster with Warren's right
hand. (Tr. 61). Moreno testified that Moreno then gave
Wilks the .22 caliber pistol telling Wilks that the officer was
probably after the gun, handed Wilks the gun, Wilks took it
with his right hand, opened the car door, heard Wilks say
"don't" or "don't shoot" or "don't, wait," and then heard shots
fired. (Tr. 62). Moreno testified that he could not see who
was shooting, but that it was not Wilks that fired the first
shot because he could tell if the shot was coming from inside
the car. (Tr. 663). Moreno testified that the gun was cocked
when he handed it to Wilks, and that Moreno had shot the
pistol along the hi.ghway from the car as they proceeded north
and before the shooting of Officer Warren in question. (Tr.
64). Moreno testified that a bullet missed him from the back.
(Tr. 66).
Defendant Wilks took the stand on his own behalf and
testified that Officer Warren's car was 8 to 10 feet behi.nd
the rear of Defendant's car. (Tr. 79). That Springville officer's car was approximately 6 to 8 feet in front of the front
of Defendant's car. (Tr. 81). That as Wilks started to stand
up in getting out of the car, Warren went for his gun, pulled
his gun, and shot at Wilks whi.le Warren was in a crouch.
(Tr. 81, 82, 83). Wilks testified that one shot was fired and
he was struck by it in the hand. (Tr. 83). That Wilks' gun
did not intentionally go off, and that after Warren had shot
once, Wilks' gun discharged once. (Tr. 85). Wilks testified
that the one shot from his gun that was fired was fired as
he was falling back into the car, and that Wilks' gun discharged almost immediately or just a couple of seconds after
Officer Warren had shot. (Tr. 88). Wilks identified State's

8
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Exhibit IV as being the same type of gun that he had, a .22
caliber pistol, and demonstrated before the Court that to fire
Exhibit IV you had to manually pull back the hammer with
your thumb to cock the gun. (Tr. 88, 89). Wilks testified
that there were three and no more than four unspent cartridges in the .22 caliber pistol at the time that he had it in
his hand when he got out of the car. (Tr. 90). Wilks testified
that Officer Warren was approximately 12 to 15 feet from
Wilks when Warren fired at Wilks. (Tr. 93). Wilks testified
that he took the gun out of the car with him to give it to
Officer Warren, and that Wilks did not aim the gun at Officer
Warren or anyone else. (Tr. 92).

I

I

.,I

I

.I

After Defendant had rested, State called Officer Holley
in rebuttal. Officer Holley identified a mark on the left front
door of the Defendant's car as illustrated in Exhibit VI that a
bullet had apparently glanced off the door into the ai.r which
had been fired from in front of Defendant's car. (Tr. 106).
A photograph entered as State's Exhibit XIII was examined
by Officer Holley and testified that there was one hole in the
windshield of Defendant's car and testified that he examined
and found three entrance holes into the windshield and two
exit holes. (Tr. 109). Officer Holley testified that two shots
entered the Defendant's car from the rear of the Defendant's
car. (Tr. 111). Officer Holley testified from Exhibits IX
and XI that he found two bullets that had been fired into
the back of the Defendant's car. (Tr. 111). Officer Holley
testified as to evidence of a split slug, and that a shot that
entered the Defendant's car from the rear was fired in a
line that Warren would have been i.n at the time. (Tr. 112).
Holley testified that a bullet fired from behind was a .38
caliber bullet. (Tr. 115). Holley further testified that he
found no powder residue or burns inside the Defendant's car
evidencing any firing from inside the car. (Tr. 118).
9
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At the conclusion of this witness, the Defendant, out of
the presence of jury, once more made a motion for directed
verdict, which the Court denied. (Tr. 137). After said motion
and out of the presence of the jury, the Court and all counsel
reviewed the prepared instructions of the Court and at that
time Defendant objected to said instructions and the failure
of the Court to give Defendant's requested instructions, including an instruction that there was not sufficient evidence
to support the conviction of the offense charged, a necessary
instruction on the intent necessary of the Defendant to be
guilty of the offense, and the Defendant took due exception
of the refusal to give said instructions.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER
WARREN TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT OVER
STRENUOUS OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT WHEN NO
USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED AND PURPOSE
WAS TO AROUSE SYMPATHY AND INFLAME JURY
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S
CASE; THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING DR. POWELL
TO TESTIFY FOR "THE STATE AS TO THE CALIBER
OF THE BULLET IN OFFICER WARREN'S HEAD.

10
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POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILURE TO GIVE THE
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBERS
2, 10, 11 AND 13.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION
NUMBERS 6, 7, AND 12.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER
WARREN TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT OVER
STRENUOUS OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT WHEN NO
USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED AND PURPOSE
WAS TO AROUSE SYMPATHY AND INFLAME JURY
AGAINST DEFENDANT.
In the testimony of Dr. Powell, witness for this State,
the Dr. testified as to the size of the holes in the head of
Officer Warren, the surgical procedures that he performed
ana on page 42, li.ne 18 of the transcript, Dr. Powell testified
"his wound has healed well." Dr. Powell further testified
as follows:
Tr. 43, line 23 : "Yes. he is unable to recollect any of
the events when I ask him, and I would not expect
him to have recollected the circumstances."
Subsequent to this testimony, the State requested permission from the Court to bring in Officer Warren. After Officer Warren was before the Court, the District Attorney
interrogated Dr. Powell as follows:
Tr. 44, li.!1.e 9:
11
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Question: "Doctor, I have in the courtroom
Trooper Warren. Could you explain to the jury
and show them on his skull where the points of
entry were?"
Answer: "There is a large scar here, a curved
scar, which is the surgical incision. This irregularity
is where the bone was removed. And the two wounds
are here on the right side of the forehead at this
point (indicating). They have become quite pale,
and you can barely see them. You can see them
clearly enough here and here (indicating)."
The above testimony was not essential in proving any
controverted issue before the Court. The defense had not
controverted the fact that there were two holes in the head
of Officer Warren, the officer could not testify by reason of
the traumatic spell of amnesia as the doctor had testified,
and the bringing in of Officer Warren served no useful purpose to assist the Court or the jury in determining facts
already established, except for the purpose of inflaming the
sympathy of the jury against the Defendant to see the pathetic
officer in his wheelchair. Everyone present in the courtroom,
including counsel, the Court, and the jury, could feel the
emotions of everyone in the courtroom at the time and during
the ·time Officer Warren was present in the courtroom.
In Volume 2 of Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Page 631,
states as follows :
"It is permissible to exhibit to the jury scars
and wounds on a person's body when a demonstration
of this nature tends to solve any controverted issue
in the case. When the character and extent of physical injury is in question, it is proper to produce the
party and to illustrate the manner of receiving and
the nature and extent of the wounds . . . ."
"Scars may always be exhibited, it seems, as evi-

12
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dence bearing upon an issue as to the seriousness of
the woui:ds by. which the scars were produced, or the
manner m which such wounds were inflicted. How~v~r,, such an exhibition should not be permitted if
it is not relevant to an issue in the case, or if the
scars are not shown to have resulted from the encom:iter which is the subject of the criminal charge,
or if the scars are not entirely the result of the
wounds inflicted by the acused, but are in part the
result of a surgical operation."
In the case of State of Montana vs. Cockrell, 309 P.2d
316, the Montana Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"Wounds received or scars left in commission
of a crime are admissible if they tend to solve some
controverted issue."
In the case of State vs. Bischert, Montana, 308 P.2d 969,
eited in State vs. Campbell, Montana, 405 P.2d 978, 22 ALR
3rd 824, the Montana Court said as follows:
"When the purpose of an exhibit is to inflame
the minds of the jury or exci.te the feelings rather
than to enlighten the jury as to any fact, it should be
excluded."
Such is the case before this Court, and this was, in fact,
the effect of the bringing of Officer Warren into the courtroom.
In Graves vs. State, Nevada, 1968, 439 P.2d 476, the
Court said as follows :
"Whether evidence of nature and extent of
injury to victim of attempted murder is of such an
inflammatory nature as to outweigh its probative
value and preclude its admission is within sound
discretion of the trial court."
In the case of State vs. Jensen, Oregon, 296 P.2d 618.
the Oregon Court held as follows:
13
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"In a capital case, evidence which might shock
jurors' sensibilities is not for that reason inadmissible, but to bring into case wholly irrelevant evidence
of gruesome character merely for purpose of exciting
feelings of hate on part of jury against defendant
would be indefensible and intolerable."
In STATE vs. POE, 1969, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P
2d 512, the Supreme Court of Utah was faced with the issue
as to whether or not the Trial Court had used its discretion
in admitting into evidence colored-slides made of victim during
the course of autopsy and permitting them to be displayed to
jury by means of slide projector and screen. The Court in
reversing the judgment and remanding it for a new trial
held as follows :
"Initially, it is within the sound discretion of
the Trial Court to determine whether the inflammatory nature of such slides is outweighed by their
probative value with respect to a fact in issue. If
the latter they may be admitted even though gruesome. In the instant case they had no probative
value. All the material facts which could conceivable
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had
been established by uncontradicted lay and medical
testimony. The only purpose served was to inflame
and arouse the jury."
The Utah Supreme Court cited OXENDINE vs. STATE,
335 P 2d 940, Oklahoma and 73 ALR 2d 802 as authority
for the above ruling. The OXENDINE vs. STATE OF OKLAHOMA case held as follows:
"If princi.pal effect of demonstrative evidence

such as photographs is to arouse the passion of the
jury and inflame them against the defendant because
of the horror of the crime, the evidence must be excluded, although, if the evidence has probative value
with respect to a fact in issue that outweight the
14
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danger of prejudice to the defendant, the evidence
is admissible even if it is gruesome and may incidentally arouse the passions of the jury."
In the case before this Court there was not a controverted
issue before the Court to be served by Officer Warren being
brought into the court room. The pointing out of the surgical
scar was not material to the issues of the case; there was no
probative value in the testimony. There was no controverted
issue in the case that the officer was shot, no controverted issue that there were two holes in the officer's head nor size
of the holes in Officer Warren's head. There was a controverted issue as to the caliber of the bullet that struck the
officer, but the bringing of Officer Warren into the Court
room did not go to that issue and did not assist the Court
nor the jury in determining that issue. The only purpose and
affect of bringing Officer Warren into the court room was
to inflame the minds of the jury or excite their feelings rather
than to enlighten them as to any fact and this was the very
real effect that was accomplished in the court room at that
time. Defendant earnestly submits that the Trial Court abused
its discretion in admitting Officer Warren into the court
room when in fact, said appearance served no useful purpose.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S
CASE; THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
The State failed as a matter of law to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant assaulted Officer War-
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ren with a revolver with the intent to commit murder. At
the conclusion of the State's case, there was no evidence that
the Defendant had shot and hit Officer Warren, there had
been no gun identified for that purpose. One of the officer
witnesses for the State testified he heard two shots purportedly fired by Defendant, one immediately after another
in rapid fire succession, and another officer witness of the
State testifi€d that as he approached the scene there was only
one shot fired. The physical facts are such that the .22 caliber
pistol in evidence could not be fired rapid fire, was a single
shot we3.pon th:>.t had to be cocked after each shot, and there
is a very pronounced reasonable doubt as to the physical ability of anyone to fire the alleged .22 pistol under the distances
and circumstances surrounding the facts of the case in the
manner in which the State's witnesses testified. It is physically impossible for such a weapon to be fired as the State's
witnesses testified. The facts are uncontroverted that Officer
Warren was in direct line with the fire of Officer Duke. (See
Exhibit XIII) that bullets were ricocheting around and about
Defendant's car, that bullets had, in fact, split. There was
no evidence, although the doctor had removed some of the
bullet fragments from the head of Officer Warren, as to
whether the fragments had come from the .22 caliber bullet
or a .357 or .350 caliber pistol. There were no identifying
fingerprints or marks upon the gun that was finally introduced after the State had rested. The State's witnesses did
not testify that they saw any gun in the hand of Defendant
Wilks at any time during the shootings that took place. The
State's witnesses, in the State's case, testified that Officer
Warren had not drawn his gun and had fired no shots, when
the physical evidence introduced in Defendant's case clearly
showed that shots had been fired from the direction i.n which
Officer Warren has been and into the back of Defendant's
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car and through the windshield of Defendant's car which
were not made by any caliber pistol the size that Defendant
had had possession of. If you completely disregard the testimony of the witnesses for the Defendant and just examine the
physical evidence before the Court, as a matter of law there
was not sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to
prove the Defendant guilty of the offense charged.
In the burden of proving a crime, the State has the burden
of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. State vs. Hendricks, Utah, 1953, 258 P.2d
453; State vs. Laris, Utah, 1931, 2 P.2d 243. In instruction
No. 8, the Court instructed as to the elements of the crime as
follows:
('

Instruction No. 8 :
"The material allegations of the crime of assault
with intent to commit murder as charged in the information are as follows:
1. That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1969,
the Defendant made an assault on Charles Warren.
2. That the assault, if any, was made with a loaded
revolver which the Defendant held in his hand.
3. That the assault, if any, was made without just
cause or excuse and with intent to murder Charles
Warren.
4. That the Defendant then and there had the
present ability to accomplish the death of Charles
Warren."
The evidence of the State and in the State's case did not
produce any evidence to prove element No. 2 in the above
instruction; the evidence of the State's case did not prove
element No. 3 in the above instruction. There was no evidence
in the State's case that the Defendant had a loaded revolver
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in his hand except that shots were heard by Officer Duke.
Officer Duke testified that he heard there were two shots, and
Officer Rasmussen, approaching from the west, heard one
shot. There is physical evidence in the photographs before
the Court that there were at least two holes in the rear of the
Defendant's car and at least one exiting through the windshield that was made of a caliber bullet that the officers were
using, and that was not in the possession of the Defendant.
There is no evidence of a premeditated or intentional aiming
of the gun in any manner with the necessary intent to murder.
Even if you entirely disregard the witnesses for the defense,
the physical evidence in the State's case do not carry the
burden of proof necessary in a criminal matter, beyond a
reasonable doubt, as required by law.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING DR. POWELL
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CALIBER OF BULLET IN OFFICER WARREN'S HEAD.
Dr; Powell testified on direct examination in part as follows:
Tr. 38, line 9:
"Question: Doctor, were you able to tell the size
of the holes, these holes that you mentioned of entry?"
Answer: Yes, the two holes were approximately
14 of an inch in diameter. About %. of an inch apart,
and they looked to me like they might have been made
by a .32-size bullet. And I put that down on my emergency room report, that they suggested a .32 caliber
bullet, and I put a question mark, because I wasn't
entirely sure."
"Question: Are you familiar with the different
sizes of bullets, .32, .22, .3, .357, etc.?"
"Answer: Yes."

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Question: Do you have an opinion as to whether
or not this size of hole-strike that. Have you, in your
work, had occasion to examine other gunshot
wounds?"
"Answer: Many."
"Question: And based upon your training and
experience, do you have an opinion as to whether or
not this hole could have been caused by a shell larger
than a .32 ?"
"Answer: Yes."
"Question: What is your opinion?"
"Answer: No, i.t could not have been. It could
have been a .32 caliber bullet hole, but it was too small
to be larger than a .32 caliber."
"Question: Could it have been a .357 Magnum?"
"Answer : No."
"Question: Could it have been a .22 ?"
"Answer: Yes, it might be."
Tr. 44, line 20:
"Question: Doctor, based on these two wounds,
the shell fragment to the back of the skull, do you
have an opinion as to how many bullets entered the
skull?"
"Answer: Yes."
"Mr. Christensen: If your Honor please, we object to his answering. He doesn't know where these
were fired from, or how these were fired, or if there
was a split slug, for instance. I think he could testify
that there are two holes. There are probably two projectiles. But whether or not they were two separate
bullets, I don't think he is confident and has enough
knowledge to express his opinion, and we object to
him so doing."
"The Court: The objection will be overruled."
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"Question: You may answer, doctor."
"Answer : There were two wounds of entry
which were identical. Both appeared to be bullet
wounds of entry. One large fragment is still within
the head, and is a bullet which has been altered by
striking something, it is irregular. The other small
fragments may or may not, may be fragments of this
ont bullet, or could be fragments of a second bullet
which exploded. There are three possibilities, and I
couldn't di.fferentiate between the two possibilities on
the base of the medical evidence."
"Question: Now you say the holes are similar. Do
you mean the same size?"
"Answer: The same size, the same appearance."
"Question: And do you have an opinion, doctor,
as to the caliber of the bullet that remains there, based
upon its size from the X-ray."
"Mr. Christensen: If Your Honor please, if he
has got an opi.nion, he may answer yes or no."
"Witness: It is my opinion that"Mr. Christensen: If Your Honor please, I object
to his testifying. He has shown no foundation as to
how he determined what the size is. There is nothing
in the record to show any basis or any foundation for
such an opinion. We object to it."
"Mr. Maxfield: Your Honor, the doctor has testified that he is familiar with the different caliber
weapons. He has seen manv bullet wounds of this
type. We feel that he is qualified to tell the different
calibers by the size. I think he is qualified to answer
the question."
"The Court: The objection is overruled, he may
answer."
"]\.fr. Christensen: May I make one observation,
Your Honor?"
"The Court: Yes, you may."
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"Mr. Christensen: I further object on the
grounds that there is no indication how the measurements were made, from what basis he has made his
calculation or determination, and I think there is no
foundation laid."
"The Court: The objection will be overruled, he
may answer."
"Mr. Maxfield: You may answer, doctor."
"Answer: Judging from the appearance of the
bullets still retained, this could be either a .22 deformed, or a .32. But I aon't think it would be larger than
a .32."
Question : Were any fragments taken out or any
portions of bullets large enough that the caliber of
the bullets could be ascertained?"
"Answer : No."
"Mr. Maxfield: No further questions. Do we
have any further need of Mr. Warren?"
"By the Court: Do you have any further need,
Mr. Christensen?"
"Answer: No, Your Honor."
"Question: Mr. Taylor?"
"Answer: No, Your Honor."
"The Court: Very Well, he may be taken out of
the courtroom."
Tr. 47- Cross-Examination, line 5:
"Question: Dr. Powell, you, of course, have no
knowledge as to how the projectiles got into the head,
other than the fact that they were there, other than
the eevidence that you have seen?"
"Answer: That is correct."
"Question: You say that the projectile is still
there, you think it could be a .22 or possibly a .32. It
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could be a fragment of a .357, could it not, as far as
you know?"
"Answer: That would be a remote possibility. It
appears to be a somewhat deformed bullet of a smaller
caliber."
"Question: But isn't it true, doctor, that when
a bullet strikes the skull very strange things happen
to it?"
"Answer: Correct."
"Question: Distended, it may explode. A lot of
things could transpire i.n respect to it?"
"Answer: Correct."
"Question: That would also be true, would it not,
Doctor, if the bullet struck an object before it entered
the head. It might break it in two or split it in two?"
"Answer : Yes."
"Question: So that it could, i.n fact, be one bullet
that is split in two that made these two bullets?"
"Answer: That would be a possibility."
"Question: Is there any way of determining
whether there is more than one bullet track through
the brain, doctor?"
"Answer: No."
"Question: These X-rays from which you have
testified, doctor, I take it were taken by you?"
"Answer : They were taken by my order by the
X-ray department."
"Question: Were they taken with the specific
thought in mind of measuring the size of the object
that you located in the brain?"
"Answer: They were taken with the object of
learning what we could about the injury, and whether
there were bullets in the head, and if so, where.
Whether there was a facture, or any other detail we
could determine."
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"Question: But were they specifically taken to
determine the size of the object as it actually is in the
head?"
"Answer: No."
The above portion of the transcript is the evidence concerning the alleged size of the piece of metal in Officer Warren' s head at the present time. The Court will note there has
been no foundation laid for the doctor's ability to discern and
determine the si.ze and caliber of bullets, other than the one
question that he is familiar with sizes and has examined bullet
wounds. The testimony of the doctor himself is such that the
two holes in the head of Officer Warren could have been made
by one bullet split in two. The evidence before the Court was
that shots were being fired from Officer Duke's gun, a .357
Magnum bullet, some of the shots being armor piercing ammunition. Officer Warren was in the direct line of fire of Officer Duke. Defendant submits to the Court that there was not
sufficient foundation laid by the State for Dr. Powell to testify
as he did.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2, 10,
11, AND 13.
Defendant's requested instruction No. 2 defines the words
"unlawful and unlawfully", "deliberate", "premediate", "intent", and "specific i.ntent". These terms and definitions are
essential in instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime
charged. These definitions are properly defined under the law.
Defendant's requested instruction No. 10 is as follows:
Instruction No. 10:
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"Under the law of this State, every person who
with intent to commit murder, commits an assault
upon the person of another is guilty of assault with
intent to commit murder. An assault is an unlawful
attempt coupled with the present ability to commit
a violent injury on the person of another. Before you
can convict the Defendant, John Charles Wilks, of the
crime of assault with intent to commit murder, you
must believe from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has established each and all
of the following propositions:
1.

2.
3.

That on or about September 2, 1969, the Defendant made an ass2.ult upon Charles 'Varren with a
revolver in Utah County, State of Utah.
That at the time of the making of such assault,
the Defendant specifically intended to murder
the said Charles Warren.
That the Defendant then and there had the present ability to accomplish the death of Charles
Warren.

If the State has failed to prove any one or more
of the foregoing elements by evidence which convinces
you beyond a reasonable doubt, then I charge you,
members of the jury, that it is your duty to find the
Defendant not guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder.
If the State has proved to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the elements
above mentioned and set out, then I charge you that
the Defendant is guilty of assault with intent to commit murder as is charged in the information."
Defendant's requested instruction No. 11 is as follows:
"If vou believe from the evidence that Defendant, John Charlei;; Wilks. accidentallv, or unintentionalhr fired or djR<>hartred a revolver in his hand and
without a snecific intent to either aRsault or kill
Charles Warren, then you are hereby directed to find
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the Defendant not guilty of the offense charged in
the information."
Defendant's requested instruction No. 13 is as follows:
"You are instructed that if from all the evidence
you .find tha~ Defendant's gun accidentally or unintentionally discharged and without a specific intent
to murder or a specific intent to do great bodily harm,
then you are directed to find the Defendant not
guolty."
The foregoing instructions requested by the Defendant
but refused by the Court state with clarity the Defendant's
theory and defense in this case. State of Utah vs. Gillian, 1970,
23 Utah 2d 372, 463, P. 2d 811. It was the theory and he defense of he Defendant in this case that the gun accidentally
and unintentionally discharged ; that one of the chief and primary elements of the offense charged was that there had to
be a specific intent in the mind of the Defendant to murder
Officer Warren at the time of the discharge of the Defendant's
gun. The circumstances of the Defendant, being surounded by
two police cars, the fact the Defendant was being fired at by
the officers, the physical evidence of the improbability of being
able to accurately fire a single shot, non-automatic .22 caliber
pistol all substantiate the Defendant's theory and defense in
this matter. The failure to give the above instructions wiped
out Defendant's theory of defense.
76-30-1, U.C.A., 1953, defines murder as follows:
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought."
76-30-2, U.C.A., 1953, defines "malice" as follows:
"Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is
expressed when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfullv to take the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no co11siderable provocatio:n
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appears, or when the circumstances attending the
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart."
76-30-14, U.C.A., 1953, is the offense charged in the
above case which is as follows:
,
"Assault with intent to murder. Every person
who assaults another with intent to commit murder
is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison for
a term of from five years to life."
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State vs. Minousis,
228 Pac. 574, is a Utah case in which the defendant was charged with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder.
The Court held as follows :
"In order to convict one charged with assault
with intent to commit murder, there must exist in
mind of accused specific intent to take life of person
assaulted."
"Specific intent to take life of person assaulted
may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence and may be inferred by acts and conduct of
accused, nature of weapon, and manner of its use,
together with all other circumstances in the case."
In the above case the facts were such that there was a
prolonged period of time in which the guards of the mine in
Carbon County and the workers had confronted each other
during the day; that there were prolonged belligerent attitudes
between the parties as well as uncomplimentary remarks exchanged between them; there was evidence of heated debate
between the parties, a conduct of following the individual shot
and direct evidence on the shooting itself, a witness having
seen the gun in the hand of the defendant as it shot the person
assaulted. The facts of the case before this Court do not sho-w
any premeditation, conduct warranting deliberation, and the
direct evidence that was in the Minousis case.
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In the case of State vs. Buchanan, Idaho, 252 P. 2d 524,
in a case involving assault with intent to commit murder, the
Ida ho Court stated as follows:
"Whether a specific intent to murder existed in
mind of accused is a question of fact to be determined
by jury from all the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom, and it is not a matter of legal presumption."
"Specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of

offense of assault with intent to murder, and such
intent may generally be inferred from the unlawful
use of deadlv weapon, PROVIDED IT WAS USED
IN A WAY TO INDICATE INTENTION TO KILL."

The instructions given by the Court did not require and
define with clarity the specific intent in the mind of the Defendant necessary and as an essential element of the offense.
The jury did not have an opportunity under the instructions
given and the failure of the Court to give the requested instructions to determine whether or not there was a specific
intent in the mind of the Defendant to ki.Il Officer Warren.
Under the instructions given the jury did not have to find and
did not determine whether there was a specific intent required.
In the case of State of Utah vs. Peterson, 1969, 22 Utah
2d 377, 453 P.2d, 696, the Court had before i.t the crime of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm.
The Court there cites the above stated Minousis case. In the
Peterson case the facts were such that there was dirct evidence
that the defendant had a hunting knife in his hand, made a
slashing motion toward the injured party and, in fact, cut the
injured party. The Court found and ruled that the defendant
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences
of his acts, and that the acts were sufficient to prove the crime
without proving the thoughts of the defendant at the time the
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act occurred. In the case now before this Court there is not
suffici.ent evidence to prove the premeditation and specific
intent. There is not even direct evidence that the Defendant
in fact, hit and struck Officer Warren. Dr. Powell testified'
that the caliber of the bullet that struck Officer Warren was
a .32 caliber, and this evidence was given without a sufficient
basis or foundation to allow the testimony of Dr. Powell as to
expertise on this ballistic testimony.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO.
6, 7, AND 12.
A portion of the Court's instruction So. 6 is as follows:
(b) "An assault with intent to commit murder is an
unlawful attempt, coupled with an ability."
The above instruction and the portion stated herein, is
contrary to law i.n that it did not indicate to the jury that the
Defendant must have had an intent to commit murder as an
·element of he charge made against him.
Defendant excepts to instruction No. 7 given by the Court
which is as follows :
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being,
with malice, aforethought.
The words malice or maliciously, as used in the foregoing definition of murder and elsewhere in these
instructions denote a wicked intention of the mind;
an act done with a depraved mind and attended with
circumstances which indicate a wilful disregard for
the rights or sofety of others.
The word 'afterthought' means only that the intent
must precede the act as distinguished from afterthought. 'Afterthought' does not imply deliberation or
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the lapse of considerable time.
As used in connection with murder, 'malice' may be
either expressed or implied.
Malice is expressed when there is an intention unlawfully to kill a human being.
Malice is implied ( 1) when the killi.ng results from an
act involving a high degree of probability that it will
result in death, which act is intentionally done for a
base, anti-social motive, and with wanton disregard
for human life.
The term 'malice' does not necessarily imply a preexisting hatred or enmity toward the person killed."
The above instruction is contrary to law in that it erron.J
eously makes reference to a killing, which is not an evidentiary
fact in this case, in that no death occurred. This instruction
is inappropriate for the charge made against the Defendant
and distorts the instructions insofar as the necessary intent on
the part of the Defendant, which is a matter of proof to be
made by the State.
Defendant excepts to instruction No. 12 given by the
Court whi.ch is as follows :
"The specific intent to commit murder may be proved
by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. Such
intent may be inferred from the acts and conduct of
the Defendant, the nature of the weapon used and the
manner of its use, all considered in connection wi.th
the other circumstances present in the incident in
question.
A person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts. However, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence introduced at the
trial."
The above instruction unduly stresses circumstantial evidence as permitting a finding of guilty wherein the Court fully
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and adequately instructed the jury as to this matter in instruction No. 17.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion the Court committed prejudicial error in
permitting the State to bring Officer Warren into the court
room when no useful purpose wes served ; there was not a controverted issue before the Court concerning Officer Warren
which justified his appearance before the Court and when he
could not and did not testify. The very real and dramatic affect in the court room was to arouse sympathy for the officer
and the State and inflame the jury against the Defendant and
this inflamatory appearance in conjunction with the other error herein stated dramatically and prejudicially affected the
jury. The State did not prove the necessary elements of the
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and the Court erred
in refusing to direct Defendant's motion for a directed verdict
at the conclusion of the State's case; the State specifically
failed to prove that the Defendant shot and hit Officer Warren. The facts and surrounding circumstances did not
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the specific intent of the Defendant which was necessary as one of the elements of the
crime beyond the necessary reasonable doubt standard. The
Court prejudicially erred in permitting Doctor Powell to testify as to the caliber of the bullet in Officer Warren's head in
that the Doctor admitted that the X-rays taken were not taken
for the purpose of measuring the object, admitted that the
bullets do split, explode and other unusual results when they
hit a humari head; the State did not lay a sufficient foundation
as a matter of law to permit the Doctor to testify as to the
caliber of the object in the head of Officer Warren; the physical evidence itself substantiated the fact that the caliber of
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bullet in Officer Warren's head was larger than the caliber of
the pistol in the possession of the Defendant. Defendant's Requested Instruction Numbers 2, 10, 11 and 13 were necessary
and according to law with regard to the essential elements of
the crime charged ; the said Requested Instructions described
accurately Defendant's theory of the case and Defendant was
prejudicially denied his lawful right to have his theory presented before the jury; the crime of assault with intent to commit murder requires a specific intent to commit murder at the
time of the discharge of Defendant's gun; the failure of the
Court to gi.ve Defendant's Requested Instructions 2, 10, 11 and
13 in conjunction with giving of the Court Instruction Numbers 6, 7 and 12 prejudiced the Defendant in the minds of the
jury. The Court erred in giving the Court Instruction Numbers
6, 7 and 12, they were contrary to law i.n that they did not
indicate to the jury that the Defendant must have had a specific intent to commit murder and said instructions erroneously makes reference to a killing which is not evidencial fact in
this case in that no death occurred; these said Instructions
unduly stressed circumstantial evidence as permitting a fi.nding of guilty. Defendant respectfully submits to the Court that
the above errors were prejudicial and directly influenced the
jury adversely against the Defendant and that there certainly
was a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. Consequently the
verdict of the jury below and the judgment thereupon should
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Thomas S. Taylor
for CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY
Attorneys for Appellant
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